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Introduction
The Stability Pact was designed in order to achieve price stability and sustainable growth in the long-term for members of the euro zone. Its main issue is to achieve zero public deficits in the medium-term with the aim of producing greater budget flexibility when members suffer asymmetric shocks and fall into recession. A balanced public budget allows economic adjustments to be made in the short-term, when the economies involved are affected by asymmetric shocks, without disturbing price stability. In the absence of the exchange rate mechanism and a centralized budget, national government budgets are the only available means for state members to cope with asymmetric shocks. National budgets have to play the role of automatic stabilizers when an economy is hit by recession. This is the main advantage of the Stability Pact: it gives the members of a monetary union more room for manoeuvre and compensates for a loss of both monetary independence and exchange rate policy.
The Maastricht criteria regarding nominal convergence and the Stability Pact requirements made on public deficits have imposed some important constraints which are neither favourable to growth nor to unemployment performance. Before the EMU was established, members could use monetary policy to control inflation, fiscal policy to deal with unemployment and exchange rate policy to bring their Balance of Payments into equilibrium. Since the EMU was implemented, member countries have still had to deal with the same problems of internal and external equilibrium but have had less economic policies available to work with. Exchange rate policy was vanished and monetary policy is no longer national or independent for member states. The only national and independent policy remaining, is fiscal policy, but even that is constrained by the requirements of the Stability Pact. Hence, member countries are not free to choose the exchange rate they want, the inflation rate and interest rate suitable to their economic needs and the unemployment rate they wish to have. Beside that, the EMU monetary authorities have proved to be more concerned with maintaining price stability than with promoting growth or reducing unemployment in Europe.
Statistical evidence from the last decade shows that since the imposition of the 1 With this study we try to contribute to the debate providing solid empirical evidence in order to answer the questions raised above.
The present paper is organised as follows: Part 2 makes some theoretical considerations on the Stability Pact and discusses its relevance in a Monetary Union;
Part 3 analyses the historical data related to the Maastricht criteria since 1980; Part 4
estimates the direct effects of the Maastricht criteria on growth by using panel data analysis and discusses the obtained results; In a similar analysis, Part 5 considers the effects of the Maastricht criteria on unemployment through growth performance;
Section 6 discusses some alternative ideas that could lead to a more flexible Stability
Pact that might favour both growth and employment. The last section summarizes the main findings.
Some theoretical considerations regarding the Stability Pact.
The Stability Pact, which is the extension of the Maastricht Treaty requirements, establishes the necessary conditions for more efficient monetary integration. It is consistent with the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) doctrine, which was developed by Mundell (1961) . The OCA defines a set of rules in order to minimize the costs of achieving the macroeconomic goals of internal balance (low inflation and low unemployment) and external balance (a sustainable balance-of-payment position) in a currency union without using the exchange rate as an adjustment mechanism. The preaccession requirements to the OCA are related to the nominal or monetary convergence of low inflation and long term interest rates, exchange rate stability and public finance 1 See, for instance, Alho (2001) , Artis and Buti (2001) , Blanchard and Perotti (2001) , Brück et al. (2002) , Casella (1999) , Gali and Perotti (2003), and Perotti (2002) . discipline, as have been adopted by the Maastricht Treaty. If the objective of the union is to guarantee price stability then nominal convergence is a necessary condition.
According to OCA norms, wage flexibility and labour mobility are some additional conditions necessary in dealing with asymmetric shocks, which may affect the members of the union differently. A fall in real wages will be necessary if a country that has been affected by a negative demand shock wants to improve its competitiveness, as exchange rate changes option is no longer available. Migration of the unemployed forces may solve the problem of social costs in depressed areas and also contribute to the convergence of real wages within the union. Problems will arise, however, if real wages are not flexible enough, or labour mobility not high enough, as is the case with the EU. In this case of rigidities, the areas affected by a demand shock will have to support the costs of unemployment and current account deficit, and restore equilibrium, by deflating their economies. This could be avoided if an efficient centralised budgetary policy and an active regional policy, at union level, are able to restore equilibrium by transferring resources from the surplus countries to the deficit countries. The Stability Pact is thought to play this automatic adjustment role (replacing the exchange rate policy) in the case where wages are rigid, labour mobility is limited and federal budgetary policy is not significant. After a negative demand shock, equilibrium can be restored by public spending (or tax reduction) during a recession, and by a reverse policy during expansion to reduce inflationary pressures. Therefore, the Stability Pact substitutes the exchange rate policy to give some flexibility to a system that would otherwise be overly rigid.
The degree of openness is also an important criterion to define OCA. According to McKinnon (1963) the greater the openness of an economy, the greater the benefits of a fixed exchange rate system will be, avoiding the consequences of imported inflation, eliminating speculative crises and uncertainty on trade. On the other hand, Kenen (1969) argues that fixed exchange rates are more adequate for diversified economies.
Countries with a less diversified output structure and supply of exports are subject to more asymmetric shocks, making them less suitable to form a monetary union. This is also Krugman's 2 view, who stresses that when economic integration increases, the countries involved become more specialized, so that they will be subjected to more, rather than fewer, asymmetric shocks.
However, this is not the view of the European Commission, presented in the report "One Market, One Money". According to them, differential shocks on demand will occur less frequently in a monetary union as trade is, to a large extent, intraindustry trade (based on product differentiation). This trade structure leads to a situation where most demand shocks will affect each country of the union in a similar manner.
Economic integration will make asymmetric shocks between nations less likely and instead of being asymmetric these shocks will tend to be more symmetric (DeGrauwe, 2000) .
Frankel and Rose (1998) also showed that the synchronisation of economic cycles is an important element in evaluating the costs of the monetary union. When all economies of the union are moving along the same pace of the economic cycle, the impact of the specific asymmetric shocks will be less significant. In terms of the efficiency of the common monetary policy, the synchronisation of business cycles is a very important element. Centralised monetary policy is more effective when the economies are all on the same cycle and affects equally all members of the union.
Monetary policy can affect the members of the union differently when they find themselves in a different position on the cycle, and can be more suitable to some and less suitable to others.
According to the theory of optimum currency areas, a monetary union should proceed with some kind of centralization of the national budgets to allow for automatic transfers to regions and countries that are affected by negative shocks. Monetary unification in Europe has been realized without having any significant central European budget system. In the absence of the exchange rate mechanism and an efficient centralized European budget, national government budgets are the only available instruments for member states to confront asymmetric shocks. Therefore, national budgets must play some role of automatic stabilizers when an economy is hit by recessions (DeGrauwe, 2000) . Here is the importance of the existence of the Stability Pact offering to the members of a monetary union more room of manoeuvre to absorb negative shocks, once monetary and exchange rate policies are not national policy instruments. Another reason for the existence of the Stability Pact is to avoid the occurrence of asymmetric shocks, which may arise from the different fiscal policies of the union members. The objective of a zero public deficit will oblige a higher harmonisation of the public spending and tax revenue policies between the members of the union. This reduces the possibility of negative shocks caused by differences in taxation and public spending policies. Consequently, another concern of the Stability Pact relates to the spill over effects of unsustainable national debts and deficits in particular countries (especially large countries), which may harm other member countries and may exert pressure on the ECB policy to ensure price stability.
Historical analysis of the Maastricht criteria
The Maastricht Treaty came into force in 1992 and represented the first great step toward the creation of an economic monetary union (EMU) in Europe. The countries that signed the Treaty had to accomplish some criteria in order to be accepted as members of the EMU. 3 These criteria were established in order to achieve nominal (and somehow a real) convergence and to reduce the economic disparities that exist between the European Union (EU) countries before the creation of the EMU in 1999.
Having committed themselves to these criteria, the countries involved surrendered a degree of their national sovereignty to the monetary authorities of the EMU, and lost a great deal of flexibility at economic policy level. By 1999, they had further lost all control over the exchange rate and monetary policies with their adhesion to the EMU.
The European Central Bank (ECB) is now having a total control of these policies. The only policy remaining in the hands of members is fiscal policy, but even this is limited by the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact, which aims to guarantee the equilibrium of public finances, avoid inflationary pressures, and promote economic growth in the euro area. Despite its relative success in controlling public deficits and achieving price stability in the Euro land, there is no evidence of great concern shown 3 The Maastricht criteria were: 1) Government budget deficit of less than 3% of GDP; 2) Government national debt of less than 60% of GDP; 3) Price stability: an average rate of inflation no more than 1.5 percentage points above that of the three best performing member states; 4) Convergence of the interest rates between countries: an average nominal long-term interest rate not more than 2 percentage points above that of the three best performing member states; 5) Exchange rate stability: participation in the normal bands of the Exchange Rate Mechanism for at least two years without devaluations. All the above criteria were required to be fulfilled by 1999.
for economic growth. Statistical evidence clearly shows a declining economic activity and increasing unemployment.
a) Growth performance
Economic growth in Europe has, in fact, been tendentiously moderate since 1980. Portugal and Spain in 1986, and finally, Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995. 5 The main exception was Ireland, whose growth of real GDP reached its higher ever levels. 6 The solutions can also be found in the OCA`s norms as explained in section 2.
It is evident from the historical data that the Maastricht criteria, and more recently the Stability and Growth Pact have contributed to the harmonization of growth of real output between the EU members. However, their effects on growth have been less than desired, and they may cause problems in dealing with future asymmetric shocks and economic crises.
b) Unemployment performance
The historical data on unemployment also shows that unemployment rates increased moderately after the imposition of the Maastricht criteria in a majority of EU member states (see table A.2 and graph A.2 in the Appendix). Beside the different rates between countries, there is a tendency for unemployment to persist after economic recessions. 7 In the early 80s the rate of unemployment in Europe was relatively low, but it increased in the middle of the decade, and declined again by the end of the decade, following the cycle of economic growth. However, after the imposition of the Maastricht criteria in 1992, unemployment increased again and reached even higher levels than those attained in the 80s. 8 The 1992-1993 financial crisis and economic recession affected the unemployment records significantly, and these were extended to the following years. In the late 90s unemployment went down again in all EU countries, although the levels remained higher than those recorded at the beginning of 80s and 90s, in most member states. Unemployment increased again with the economic recession that began in 2001. As with growth performance of real GDP, the unemployment rates also seem to be affected by the constrains of the Maastricht criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact obligations.
c) Government deficits
One of the Maastricht criteria stipulated a reduction in government deficits to below 3% of GDP by 1999. The Stability Pact reinforced this target for the years following 1999 in order to avoid the deregulation of state public accounts and to create higher budget flexibility. This is especially necessary, when countries suffer asymmetric shocks and fall into recession. It is clear from table A.3 and graph A.3 (see Appendix) that the EU members made a great effort to meet this criterion. Before the Maastricht
Treaty came into force a majority of the EU countries had unbalanced public accounts, and some of them recorded large public deficits. After the imposition of the Treaty, government deficits were reduced and all countries reached their targets of having a deficit less than 3% of GDP by 1999. Despite this relative success, the recession that began in 2001 seemed to create certain difficulties in reaching zero public deficit in some countries, such as France, Germany and Portugal. In order to avoid a deepening crisis it is necessary to use a more active (growth inducing) fiscal policy which is, however, inconsistent with the Stability Pact obligations. As some countries still need to balance their public accounts they may have some additional problems in improving their economic performance in the future without a more flexible fiscal policy favouring aggregate demand through public investment.
d) Government national debt
With the high levels of public deficits registered in the 80s, national debt continued growing until early 90s. Therefore, since 1992 another concern of the EU members has been the reduction of their national debts to below 60% of GDP. Almost all countries had reached this target by the end of 1999, and those which failed (Belgium, Greece, and Italy) at least showed a substantial declining tendency in their public debts (see table A.4 and graph A.4 in the Appendix).
e) Inflation rate
In the 80s inflation rates were relatively high in almost all of the countries analysed here. Therefore, the monetary authorities of the EU had the concern of including another criterion into the Maastricht Treaty to guarantee price stability through a higher coordination of monetary policies among the members. The reduction and convergence of inflation rates between EU members became another necessary target as exchange rate policy gradually disappeared. Table A .5 and graph A.5 (see Appendix) clearly show the reduction of inflation in the 90s and a strong commitment with this criterion by all countries since 1992. In fact, price stability continues to be one of the main preoccupations and is indeed one of the main achievements of the European Central Bank.
f) Interest rate
During the process of nominal convergence towards a European Monetary
Union it was also necessary to ensure the convergence of interest rates between member states. In the 80s there were wide differences between countries. Some had interest rates of nearly 20% while others presented rates of about 10% (see table A.6 and graphA.6 in the Appendix). Indeed, there was a large discrepancy in the interest rates between these countries due to widely differing inflation rates. After 1992 a convergence of the interest rates was achieved in the EU due to a more coordinated monetary policy and a higher exchange rate stability. The target of interest rate convergence was finally achieved in 1999, and since then it has been the ECB that is responsible for fixing interest rates in the euro zone seeking for price stabilisation in the whole area.
g) Exchange rate
The process towards EMU also required a reduction in the variation of the exchange rates before the creation of the fixed exchange rate system and the introduction of the single currency. Therefore, it was necessary to create a mechanism to ensure such stabilization by controlling the fluctuations in parities within certain established bands. This mechanism -based on the European Monetary System (EMS) and the exchange rate mechanism -had already been created before the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty. The EMS was founded on the initiative of Germany and
France in 1979 and its first participants were Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Through a combination of policy cooperation and realignments the EMS fixed (but adjustable) exchange rate club survived and even grew (Spain joined in 1989 , Great Britain in 1990 , and Portugal in 1992 . This system established margins of currency fluctuations (initially ±2.25% and for certain countries ±6%) relatively to an assigned value (central parity). As can be seen from graph A.7, there was a higher degree of fluctuation in the exchange rates within the members of the EMS in the 80s. This difference was even greater between member and non-member states. After a period of relative stability registered in early 90s, speculative attacks forced the considerable devaluation of some currencies in 1993.
This forced the EMS authorities to widen the fluctuation bands to ±15%. This was only a temporary measure to avoid speculative attacks, once the main objective was to achieve exchange rate stability. The countries taking part in the EMU actually won this battle. Despite the long-term benefits that EMU could bring to the member countries, it has now become clear that member states are faced with the same economic problems as in the past but have less economic policies to use. Exchange rate policy has been vanished and monetary policy is neither national nor independent. The only national and independent policy available -fiscal policy -is limited by the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact. In face of that situation, what will be the impact of these policy restrictions -that first came into effect in 1992, and were reinforced in 1999 through the Stability Pact -on the economic growth of EU members? This is the main question that we shall try to answer with the empirical work developed in the next section.
Measuring the direct effects of the Maastricht criteria on growth
In the previous section, by just observing the data, we were able to detect some unfavourable tendencies on growth and unemployment in the period following the imposition of the Maastricht criteria. In this section, an attempt will be made to measure the direct effects of the Maastricht criteria on growth using a more formal way based on a panel data analysis. The equation that we estimate relates directly the growth of real GDP on the variables which determine the Maastrich criteria, namely, the ratios of the national debt (DBT) (1) with i = 1,……,15 and t = 1,……,22. The effect of the increment of public debt ratio is negative on the growth of real output and highly significant. It is interesting to note that the magnitude of the negative effect of the debt ratio is higher than the negative effects of the other Maastricht criteria.
An increase of one percentage point in the increment of the national debt ratio reduces output growth by more than 0.2 percentage points. This is evidence that the Stability Pact should pay more attention to the public debt criterion which projects the financial situation and indebtedness position of each country in relation to the exterior.
Competitiveness problems of the national economies and external trade performance are also reflected in the national debt position.
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The effect of the budget (deficit/surplus) ratio lagged for one period is also negative on the growth of real output, although its magnitude is less than the effect of Table 2 . The first point to note is that the increment of the debt ratio affects both periods equally, thus confirming the 0.2 percentage points negative impact on growth which has been found for the whole period (see Table 1 ). However, the influence of the budget (deficit/surplus) ratio on growth is different in the two periods, affecting more the pre-Maastricht period than the postMaastricht period, both in terms of the negative value of the estimated coefficient and its significance level. The slowdown of real output is slightly higher in the preMaastricht period than in the post-Maastricht period as a result of fiscal policy contraction. 11 After all, the evidence is still showing that the higher fiscal discipline after the Maastricht Treaty did not benefit the growth of real output: its impact continues to be negative. The picture in relation to the inflation rate is analogous. The negative effect of inflation on growth is slightly higher in the pre-Maastricht period and in the post-Maastricht period has no statistical significance. The fall in output growth due to exchange rate variability is higher in the post-Maastricht period where higher exchange rate stability was achieved. This is evidence that the loss of the exchange rate policy has been not favourable to economic growth in Europe. The same effect regarding the exchange rate variation in growth is not significant in the pre-Maastricht period. Similarly to the whole period, interest rate has not any significant impact on growth for either of the distinct periods.
From this separate analysis it can argued that the efforts made to meet the budget deficit criteria, and achieve exchange rate stability in the post-Maastricht period were not favourable to the growth performance of the EU countries. 
The effects of the Maastricht criteria on unemployment
In this section a similar process is used to find how the Maastricht criteria affected unemployment performance by relating unemployment rates directly to growth of real output. The idea is to test the hypothesis that unemployment follows the cyclical tendencies of economic performance in Europe. If the Maastricht criteria were unfavourable to economic growth, and unemployment followed the economic cycle, then unemployment itself would be influenced by the restrictions imposed on economic policy due to Maastricht obligations. The estimated equation relates the rate of unemployment (UR) to the growth of real output (RY) and to the rate of unemployment Since the evidence of the unfavourable effects of the Mastricht criteria are not so clear from this analysis (trough the effect of the dummy variable), we proceeded with two different estimations, distinguishing the pre-Maastricht period from the postMastricht period. Table 4 shows the estimated results of these two different periods and provides some interesting insights. Again the results are robust according to the usual criteria. The most important point to note from these separate estimations is that the fall in unemployment due to growth performance is slightly smaller in the post-Maastricht period than in the pre-Maastricht period and this evidence is apparent in all three methods of estimation. With this result it can be argued that the Maastricht restrictions were unfavourable to employment creating some additional difficulties in reducing further the high levels of unemployment in Europe. In other words, growth performance in the post-Maastricht period was not sufficient enough to reduce unemployment to the desirable levels. In this context, the euro-zone members face the following situation in implementing macroeconomic policy adjustments: exchange rate policy can no longer be used as an adjustment mechanism for macroeconomic stabilisation; monetary policy is not independent, since it is the ECB that decides which will be the inflation rate and interest rate for all participating countries in the EU, regardless of their individual economic circumstances; fiscal policy is national but subject to budget deficit constraints imposed by the Stability Pact. Therefore, the euro-zone members have less economic flexibility in making the macroeconomic adjustments necessary to stabilise their own economies, to reduce regional disparities, and to cope with asymmetric shocks that may affect them.
12 Alho (2001) and Casella (1999) also appoint that the Stability Pact has been mostly criticised from the point of view of imposing a strict constrain on short-run stabilization policies. In addition Brück el al. (2002) argue that fulfilling only the deficit target does not ensure output stabilization achievement.
It is our view that, the objectives of the ECB should be reformulated in a way to encourage full employment and higher economic activity. The ECB should have the responsibility of setting interest rates in a manner which promotes growth and full employment, rather than merely fighting inflation. Higher growth and employment can be achieved through a less rigid Stability Pact, which allows a higher flexibility in the national fiscal policy necessary to cope with the specific needs of the individual economies. We also consider that public deficit must be reduced cutting current expenditures and not productive investment. The idea that investment expenditures issues debt payments to new generations is not at all a valid argument since future generations will also benefit from these public investments. So, we agree that public investment should be promoted, especially in recession periods, in order to encourage economic activity. On the other hand, as our evidence shows, the Stability Pact needs to pay more attention to public debt performance, which reflects problems related to the competitiveness of the economies.
With the removal of exchange rate variations as an adjustment mechanism and the constraints on fiscal policy, the development of a larger and more progressive tax system at the EU level is necessary, and the use of the tax revenue in growth generating activities. Fiscal policy should work as a stabiliser, with negative shocks leading to lower taxation and higher social security payments in the regions that are adversely affected. The tax and social security systems operating at the EU level would automatically make transfers between rich and poor regions in an attempt to reduce regional disparities. These budgetary transfers would only have to be made temporally in order to deal with negative shocks that may affect some economies. The convergence process can be reinforced by extending the European Investment Bank activities to the objectives that stimulate investment in the less prosperous regions where unemployment is higher.
Summary and conclusions
The main scope of this paper is to contribute to the debate on the effectiveness of the Maastricht criteria and Stability Pact on the economic and unemployment performance in Europe.
In first place, we analysed the statistical data related to the Maastricht criteria, the growth of real output and unemployment for the period 1980-2001. It was possible to detect a higher convergence of the nominal criteria in the post-Maastricht period, but the performance of the real criteria related to the growth of output and unemployment was not satisfactory. The empirical analysis based on panel data attempted to explain these tendencies formally by estimating the direct effects of the Maastricht criteria on growth and unemployment.
Considering the whole period, the most significant negative effect on growth arises from the increment of the debt ratio. Our argument is that the Stability Pact should give more importance to this criterion, which reflects the indebtedness position of the countries and the degree of competitiveness of their economies. The debt ratio variable affects the pre and post-Maastricht periods to a similar extent.
The budget (deficit/surplus) ratio also affects the growth of real output negatively but in a somewhat modest way. Nevertheless, evidence sustains that the efforts which have been made to reduce budget deficit were not favourable to the growth of real output.
Inflation has had its expected negative effect on growth (which was higher in the pre-Maastricht period) but interest rate has not shown any significant influence in any of the periods studied. Our argument is that EU monetary policy was successful in achieving price stability but it was not favourable to growth. Interest rate policy has shown to be efficient in bringing price stability but was rather unsuccessful in encouraging higher economic activity. On the other hand, our evidence does, however, suggest that exchange rate variability was beneficial to growth, although its effect was not substantial. The loss of the exchange rate policy as an instrument for improving external competitiveness may bring some additional difficulties regarding export performance and hence growth.
The negative effects of the Maastricht criteria on growth are obvious from the dummy variable representing the post-Maastricht period. It was found that 0.5 percentage points of the fall in real output resulted from the efforts made to meet the demands of the Maastricht norms.
The effects of the Maastricht criteria on unemployment through growth were clearer. Our evidence suggests that unemployment follows the economic cycle of the EU economies, but the fall in unemployment due to growth of real output is not very significant. Unemployment falls by only 0.2 percentage points for every increase in real output of one percentage point. The fall in unemployment was even lower in the postMaastricht period suggesting that the period of nominal convergence was not beneficial in reducing unemployment. The low speed of adjustment of actual unemployment to its desirable level lends support in favour of the hysteresis phenomenon of the unemployment rate.
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